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I. Abstract
An ongoing debate among propositionalists centers on the
question: can the truth values of propositions change over time ? The view
that says that propositions can change truth values over time has been
called temporalism. The more traditional view of propositions, which
denies temporalism, and goes back to Frege, has been called eternalism.
Mark Richard1 has given forceful argument against temporalism and in
favor of eternalism: the argument from belief retention. On Richard’s
view, if temporalism comes out true then it is impossible for one to retain
one’s beliefs over time.
As an eternalist about propositions, I believe that all propositions
in some way refer to a particular time. In this paper, I will examine
Richard’s argument from belief retention and some temporalist responses
to it. Afterwards, I will introduce my own eternalist account of
propositions which will i) allow for belief retention in the precisely the
troublesome cases which form the basis of Richard’s original argument
contra temporalism ii) account for the temporalist intuition that some
propositions contain no implicit time references.

1

M. Richard, “Temporalism and Eternalism”, Philosophical Studies 39
(1981); pp 1-13

Taylor, Adam P., 2006, UMSL, p. 3

1. Introduction
This thesis explores, in part, the ontology of propositions.
Propositions are understood as the (abstract) shareable objects of belief,
meanings of sentences, and vehicles of truth-values. Consider for example
the following pair of sentences:
(1a) Die Kuh sprang über den Mond.
(1b) The cow jumped over the moon.
Here (1a) translates (1b). They share the same semantic content. The
propositionalist (i.e. the realist about propositions) will argue that if (1a) is
able to precisely translate (1b) it must be the case that both (1a) and (1b)
share some characteristic content. That content just is the proposition that
this sentence-pair expresses. It is important to note that the shared content
in this case cannot be any part of the sentences themselves since, strictly
speaking, the sentence-pair share no content (i.e. none of their constituents
are the precisely same).
Likewise when two or more individuals believe that p (where p is
any proposition at all), the ‘that p’ constituent of their belief shares some
characteristic content which just is the proposition they both believe. As in
the following case:
(1c) Matthew believes that the dish ran away with the spoon.
(1d) Sarah believes that the dish ran away with the spoon.

Taylor, Adam P., 2006, UMSL, p. 4
Here, Matthew and Sarah share roughly the same belief: ‘that p,’ where p
stands for ‘the dish ran away with the spoon.’ Suppose that Matthew and
Sarah are conversing about the dish and spoon and why they have just ran
away. If their beliefs were not the same, confusion would ensue as it
would then be impossible to truly attribute any belief to any individual. In
this case, if the belief states ascribed in (1c) and (1d) did not share some
characteristic content, then it could be the case that when Matthew
believes ‘that the dish ran away with the spoon’ he believes that ‘the the
dish ran away with the spoon’ but when Sarah believes ‘that the dish ran
away with the spoon,’ she believes that ‘President Bush is incompotent’.
In such a case, while Matthew and Sarah would seem to be talking to each
other about their shared beliefs, they would in fact be talking about totally
different beliefs. This outcome would be intolerable. Gladly, it is not the
situation we find ourselves in.
Another argument for propositions has been suggested by Matthew
McGrath, this is the “Metaphysics 101” argument.2 We begin by noting
that there is a difference between the act and content of a belief. Thus,
even while others cannot share in my belief- act, they can share the
content of my belief. For example, suppose I believe that (H) Headaches
are painful. What I believe, when I believe (H), is something that others
2

McGrath, Matthew, "Propositions", The Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy (Spring 2006 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL =
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2006/entries/propositions/>.
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also believe. We all believe headaches are painful. So the content of my
belief ‘that (H)’ is shareable. Furthermore, suppose I believe
(H`) Headaches are caused by tiny Nazi robots.
(H`) is clearly false, where (H) is clearly true. Thus (H) and (H`) are
carriers of truth values. So there are beliefs whose contents are shareable,
and carriers of truth values. Thus there are propositions, which just are the
shareable objects of belief, meanings of sentences, and vehicles of truthvalues.
Propositions, so conceived, are handy things to have in one’s
ontology. They allow one a straightforward way to explain and analyze
what it is that sentences and beliefs and utterances share when they
express some characteristic bit of content, and they offer us a way of
determining the truth value of a sentence, belief, or utterance independent
of any concerns about linguistic mud in the water. Even so, one could no
doubt develop an alternative, i.e. non-propositional, account for the shared
content of sentences, utterances, and propositional attitudes (e.g. beliefs,
fears, hopes) as Putnam and Quine have. However, insofar as I intend to
explore the nature of propositions, in this paper we will proceed (pace
Putnam and Quine) as though we were certain of their existence. An
ongoing debate among propositionalists centers on the question: can the
truth values of propositions change over time. The view that says that
propositions can change truth values over time has been called
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temporalism. The more traditional view of propositions, which denies
temporalism, and goes back to Frege, has been called eternalism. Mark
Richard3 has given forceful argument against temporalism and in favor of
eternalism: the argument from belief retention. On Richard’s view, if
temporalism comes out true then it is impossible for one to retain one’s
beliefs over time.
As an eternalist about propositions, I believe that all propositions
in some way refer to a particular time. In this paper, I will examine
Richard’s argument from belief retention and some temporalist responses
to it. Afterwards, I will introduce my own eternalist account of
propositions which will i) allow for belief retention in the precisely the
troublesome cases which form the basis of Richard’s original argument
contra temporalism ii) account for the temporalist intuition that some
propositions contain no implicit time references.
2. Eternalism, Temporalism, and truth-values
Some sentences, such as ‘it was raining in St. Louis on July 1,
2005’ express propositions that make direct references to times. Following
Richard4, we will call the propositions expressed by such sentences
‘eternal propositions.’ In order to evaluate the truth-values of such
sentences we must have to look at the time being referred to and determine
3

M. Richard, “Temporalism and Eternalism”, Philosophical Studies 39
(1981); pp 1-13
4
Mark Richard, ‘Tense, Propositions, And Meanings’ Philosophical
Studies (1981: 337-351)
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whether, at that time, the proposition expressed by the sentence comes out
true. So for example the proposition expressed by
(2) It was raining in St. Louis on July 1, 2005
will come out true iff it is the case that it was raining in St. Louis on July
1, 2005. Following Frege, eternalists consider (2) a complete proposition,
or thought, because it contains an object, a property, and an explicit
reference to a particular time.
Other sentences, on the Fregean view, are incomplete expressions
of complete propositions. For instance
(3) Nora is sleeping
Here no explicit reference to a time is made. It is natural to suppose that
‘is’ in (3) is temporal weighted and points to the present time or the time
of utterance of (3). We should resist this supposition. It is also possible to
read ‘is’ as a present progressive verb which picks out no one particular
time. As we go forward it will help to keep this reading of ‘is’ in mind.
Following Richard, then, we will call the propositions expressed by such
sentences ‘temporal propositions.’ These differ from eternal proposition
only insofar as they do not make direct references to times. Eternalists
such as Frege, Richard, and G.W. Fitch (1998) contend that temporal
propositions do not exist at all. They argue that temporal propositions
actually express eternal propositions, they merely do so incompletely. In
other words, for the eternalist, all propositions are eternal propositions
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which contain (either explicit or implicit) references to times. Thus even
(3) which seems to contain no such reference expresses an eternal
proposition. The temporalist argues to the contrary that propositions like
the one expressed by (3) can be non-time specific. Notice that if we try to
use the same sort of truth conditions for (3) as we did for (2) (i.e. if we try
to use the same truth conditions for both eternal and temporal
propositions) the outcome will be indeterminate. On these conditions (3) is
true (3*) iff it is the case that ‘Nora is sleeping’ is true at t. But because
(3) makes no explicit reference to a time (3*) is infeasible as the truth
conditions for (3). But, according to Frege, (3) actually does make an
implicit reference to a particular time: the time of utterance.5 So that if I
utter (3) at 4 the in afternoon on a workday it will come out false; if I utter
(3) at 3 in morning on a workday it will come out true, and so on. As
Frege remarks,
[A]re there thoughts which are true today but false in six months
time? The thought, for example, that the tree is covered with green
leaves, will surely be false in six months time. No, for it is not the
same thought at all. The words ‘this tree is covered with green
leaves’ are not sufficient by themselves for the utterance; the time

5

To avoid confusion, we should note that ‘utterance’ here is a technical
term in Fregean semantics and that it should not be read as synonymous
with utterance. Frege is not attempting to give us an utterance-semantics.
Instead, I suggest that we take the construction ‘time of utterance’ to be
roughly synonymous with a Kaplanian ‘context’ which I discuss below.
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of utterance is involved as well. Without the time-indication this
gives we have no complete thought, i.e. no thought at all. Only a
sentence supplemented by a time indication and complete in every
respect expresses a thought. But this, if it is true, is true not only
today or tomorrow but timelessly (1968: 533).
Note that when Frege says that sentences such as ‘this tree is covered with
green leaves’ (and (3)) express no thought at all, he does not mean that no
content is transmitted by them. On the contrary, he simply means that no
content is transmitted by them until the implicit time reference is
appended. So, when I say ‘Nora is sleeping,’ it is immediately understood
that I am really saying ‘Nora is sleeping now.’ Where now is taken as an
indexical pointing to a precise temporal location (e.g. July 1, 2006 10:34
pm CST). This all carries over for temporally unspecific sentences
attributing beliefs to individuals as well. Such sentences are incomplete
expressions of their constituent propositions; in other words they require
the addition of a time-reference in order to be complete (and to carry truthvalues), so that
(4) Eric believed that Nora was sleeping
must be supplemented by a time reference such as,
(4*) Eric believed that Nora was sleeping at t. So, ordinary
propositions and belief attribution propositions must likewise refer to the
‘time of utterance’ in order to be complete (and to have a determinate
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truth-value) on the Fregean (eternalist) view. As a consequence, suppose
that Eric asserts (3) exactly four times in his life. On eternalism, each of
Eric’s assertions expresses a different eternal proposition. Such that he is
regarded as asserting
At t1… (E1) Nora is sleeping at t1
At t2… (E2) Nora is sleeping at t2
At t3… (E3) Nora is sleeping at t3
At t4… (E4) Nora is sleeping at t4
On this view, the proposition (or content) expressed by sentence (3) varies
with each instance (E1) – (E4) at which it is asserted. Furthermore, the
truth-value of each proposition (E1) – (E4) is invariant. Thus, eternalism is
said to consist of the view that all temporally unspecific propositions are
content variant and truth invariant.6 In other words, all such propositions
have precisely fixed truth-values and differing content at every time at
which they are uttered
To sum up, on eternalism, all propositions include, implicitly,
particular times. All the eternalist does to determine the truth of (E1) –
(E4) is look at the world in question and check whether (3) is true at that
world at the time in question. For the eternalist, world + proposition ⇒
truth-value.

6

See Mark Aronszajn (1996: 74) and Brogaard (2006 forthcoming)
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But the temporalist cannot appeal to implicit time references to
determine the truth-values of such propositions as expressed by (3) and
(4). On the temporalist reading (3) and (4) express temporal propositions
and as such they make no references at all to times. We must arrive at their
truth values by different means. In the next section, we will examine the
temporalist method for determining the truth-values for incomplete
sentences and belief attributions.
The first thing to point out is that, in the foregoing discussion of
eternalism, we have treated sentences such as
(3) Nora is sleeping
as incomplete sentences expressing eternal propositions. This
characterization is correct on eternalist grounds because all propositions
contain references to times. On temporalism, however (3) expresses a
temporal proposition whose truth will depend upon the context in which
(3) is uttered. On a standard semantic theory, such as that of David
Kaplan7 a context is a set of parameters including a speaker, an addressee,
a world, a time, and a location. For example the set {Eric, Jon, the actual
world, 19:00 CST July 3 2006, St. Louis} is a context. There are two
things we should note about contexts. 1) Contexts are not to be understood
as mere ‘settings’ of utterances as we might be prone to think. Rather,

7

Kaplan, David. "Demonstratives." in Almog, Perry, and Wettstein
Themes from Kaplan. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989, pp. 481563.
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contexts in the present sense are technical entities. They need not relate to
any real world setting. 2) Not everyone agrees with Kaplan’s notion of
contexts. David Lewis argues that “no two contexts differ by only one
feature. Shift one feature only and the result of the shift is not a context at
all.”8 But for our purposes I will work within Kaplan’s framework of
contexts.
Returning to our example then, Eric says
(3) Nora is sleeping
and the temporalist wants to determine the truth-value of Eric’s utterance.
She proceeds by examining the utterance in light of the set of parameters
given above. She sees that (3) is uttered by Eric, to Jon, at the actual
world, at 19:00 CST, July 3, 2006, in St Louis. She then checks to see
whether Nora was in fact sleeping at the actual world in the same temporal
location. If so then this temporal proposition is true, if not then it is false.
Suppose, as above, that Eric asserts (3) exactly four times in his life. On
temporalism, each of Eric’s assertions expresses the same temporal
proposition, such that Eric would be regarded as saying
At t1… (E1) Nora is sleeping
At t2… (E2) Nora is sleeping
At t3… (E3) Nora is sleeping
At t4… (E4) Nora is sleeping

8

David Lewis (1998: 29)
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On this view, the proposition (or content) expressed by sentence (3) is
invariant at each instance (E1) – (E4) at which it is asserted. Furthermore,
the truth-value of each proposition (E1) – (E4) could vary depending on
the context in which it is asserted. Thus, temporalism can be said to
consist of the view that all propositions are content invariant and truth
variant.9
On temporalism, then, temporal propositions (those which contain
no implicit references to times) must be evaluated using the notion of
semantic contexts (which do include times). For the temporalist, context
<speaker, hearer, world, time, location,> + proposition ⇒truth-value.
Having said that, we should keep in mind that the temporalist does
not deny that there are some eternal propositions. For such propositions,
the temporalist simply shifts her context, omitting the time parameter,
which is now supplied by the proposition itself. Thus temporalism is more
flexible than eternalism. It allows for more than one denomination of
proposition.
3. Richard’s argument against temporalism
In ‘Temporalism and Eternalism’ Mark Richard gives what many
philosophers consider to be a decisive argument against temporalism.
According to Richard the temporalist is unable to give an adequate
account of belief retention.

9

See Mark Aronszajn (1996: 74) and Berit Brogaard (2006 forthcoming)
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Richard begins by asking us to consider the following reasoning:
(MARY)
[1] Mary believed that Nixon was president
[2] Mary still believes everything she once believed
______________________________________
[3] Therefore, Mary still believes that Nixon is president10 As
Richard notes, ‘this argument is not a valid argument in English.’ As we
use these types of sentences in English, [3] does not at all follow from [1]
& [2]. Or as Nathan Salmon puts it, ‘such an inference is an insult not only
to Mary but also to the logic of English as it is normally spoken.’11 Thus,
on pain of irrationality we ought to reject any view on which one could
reasonably conclude that MARY contains a valid inference. Unfortunately
for the temporalist, according to Richard, she is committed to the validity
of MARY. In light of this commitment, the argument goes, temporalism
ought to be rejected. The trouble here is that the conclusion shifts Mary’s
true belief that Nixon is president into the present time, and at the present
time, the belief is clearly false. But there seems to be no reason for it to be
false. If temporalism is true, and propositions contain no implicit times,
then shifting a true belief into the future by continuing to believe in it
should not be. Think of the spatial analog. If I am in St. Louis and I

10

Richard (1981) p.4
Nathan Salmon, ‘Tense and Singular Propositions,’ Themes from
Kaplan (1989) p. 345
11
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believe: “it is raining.” It would not make sense for me to move to the
Mojave and continue to believe “it is raining.” Eternalism has a rough and
ready answer for belief retention. The eternalist says that Mary believes
that “Nixon is president at t” and thus she continues to believe only that
proposition, whose truth-value is not changed by shifting the proposition
into the future. This is a thumbnail sketch of the problem of belief
retention.
According to Richard, the temporalist should assign the following
truth conditions to the premises and conclusion of MARY:
(MARYT)
[1] ∃p∃t(t < t* & p = [Pn] & Bmpt)
[2] ∀p(∃t(t < t* & Bmpt) → Bmpt*)
[3] ∃p(p = [Pn] & Bmpt*)
Here p ranges over propositions, ‘<’ means ‘is earlier than’, t* is the time
of utterance, m is a constant that refers to Mary, and [Pn] is the temporal
proposition that ‘Nixon is president’. On this reading of MARY, the first
premise states that there is a time t such that t is earlier than the time of
utterance t*, and a proposition p such that p is Nixon is president and at t
Mary believes that p. The second premise states that for all propositions p,
if there is a time t that is earlier than the time of utterance t* and Mary
believes that p, then at the time of utterance t* Mary believes that p.
Finally, the conclusion states that there is a proposition p such that p is
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Nixon is president, and at the time of utterance t* Mary believes that p. On
this temporalist reading, MARY is valid. So the temporalist is committed
to the validity of an argument that intuitively appears invalid. I say
intuitively because the following type of experiment can be done: have
any non-temporalist philosopher read MARY and tell you whether they
believe the conclusion is correct or not. In most cases ( in my experience)
they will not think the conclusion is correct. It seems to have a prima facie
invalidity.
While the temporalist must nevertheless maintain the validity of
the conclusion in MARY, the eternalist, as Richard notes, ‘is not thus
committed.’ On eternalism, the first premise of (MARY) is read as, there
is a time t such that t is earlier than the time of utterance t*, and Mary
believes at t that ‘Nixon is president at t. Taking this reading of [1] in
conjunction with the second premise (same reading as MARYT), [3]
simply does not follow.
Brogaard (2006) offers a helpful, illustrative variation on MARY.
Consider this reasoning:
(JOHN)
[1] Mary believes everything John has ever said.
[2] John said he was hungry
_______________________________________
[3] Mary believes that John is hungry
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In this example, the conclusion is clearly invalid. However, on
temporalism, [2]JOHN ought to be true iff there is some time t, such that t is
earlier than the time of utterance t*, and at t John says he is hungry, so if
Mary believes everything John has ever said it, it follows that she believes
that John is hungry. On eternalism, on the other hand [2]JOHN ought to be
true iff there is some time t, such that t is earlier than the time of utterance
t* and at t John says he is hungry at t. As a result JOHN comes out clearly
invalid on eternalism (because it does not follow from the fact that John
says he is hungry at t, and the fact Mary believes what he says [that he is
hungry at t], that she believes that John is presently hungry); in other
words, the implicit time references postulated by eternalism render JOHN
invalid.
Finally, Richard presents another variation on his argument against
temporalism that we should also consider:
(IMARY)
[a] I, Mary, believed that Nixon was up to no good in the White
House and I still believe that
________________________________________________________
[b] Therefore, I, Mary, believe that Nixon is up to no good in the
White House12

12

Richard, 1981 p.4
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IMARY is intuitively invalid. As Richard points out, ‘it would be not only
uncharitable but incorrect’ to infer [b] from [a]. According to Richard,
however, the temporalist is committed to the validity of the inference in
IMARY. Because, if temporalism is right, then [a] is true iff there is a time
t such that t is earlier than the time of utterance t* and Mary believes at t
that Nixon is up to no good in the White House, and at t* Mary still
believes that Nixon is up to no good in the White House. It follows, then,
that at t* Mary believes that Nixon is up to no good in the White House.
To put an edge on the foregoing discussion: we have seen that in
each of these cases of attribution of belief retention temporalism leads us
to the undesirable consequence of validating clearly invalid reasoning.
According to Richard, this is ample reason to reject temporalism and
accept eternalism as the correct view of unspecified temporal propositions.
Richard does consider two possible temporalist responses to his
argument. The first of these would be an alternative account of belief
retention on which we could not infer that Mary believes that Nixon is
president from the facts that Mary believed Nixon was president and Mary
retains all of her beliefs. On the second response, according to Richard,
the temporalist could offer alternative truth conditions for attributions of
belief. Let us suppose that the temporalist proffers an account of belief
retention whereon ‘to retain a belief is not to continue to believe the very
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same proposition. Rather, it is to believe a proposition related in some
special way to the proposition originally believed’13 For instance, consider
(N) Nixon is president
On the naïve view of belief retention (i.e. the pre-philosophical view) if
Mary comes to believe that (N) at time t1, then Mary retains her belief that
(N) at t2 just in case she believes the same proposition (N) at both t1 and t2.
On the alternative view, Richard suggests, we might suppose there is a
another proposition
(N2) Nixon was president
Which is related to (N) such that (N2) obtains iff (N) obtains. The
temporalist might plausibly argue that when we say Mary retains her
belief that (N), we really mean that Mary now believes (N2). This
maneuver blocks Richard’s argument because if Mary comes to believe
(N2) she need not continue to believe (N) so the conclusion of MARY is
no longer valid.
Richard objects to this move. Suppose that sometime in 2004
Mary has a belief that can be expressed by
(C) The Saint Louis Cardinals will win the pennant in 2004
Suppose that the Cardinals perform badly in the last few weeks of the
season and Mary appropriately repudiates her previous belief that (C). We
would not want to say, at the end of the season, that Mary has retained her

13

Richard, 1981 p.6
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belief that (C). However, it could be the case that in 2003 Mary had a
belief which was correctly expressed by (C). In this case, she could retain
the (true) belief that (C) while giving up the (false) belief she expressed by
(C) in 2004. However this does not work on the above account. For if the
temporalist is right, then (C) expressed precisely the same proposition in
2003 as it did in 2004. In which case, Mary believes C2003 iff she believes
C2004. In other words Mary only retains her belief from 2003, iff she
retains her belief from 2004, since they are they same belief. To clarify,
we do want Mary’s retained belief from before the 2004 season to be the
same as Mary’s belief during the 2004 season. They are clearly different
beliefs. But on the theory on offer they are treated the same.
The second account of retention that Richard suggests for the
temporalist is what I will call quasi-eternalism or qETERNALISM. On
qETERNALISM if Mary believes at time t1 that (N) ‘Nixon is president’ is
true, then she retains her belief at a later time t2 iff she believes ‘Nixon is
president at t1’ at t2 . qETERNALISM clearly avoids Richard’s argument,
but at a steep cost. First, it violates our intuitive notion that belief retention
consists of a relation to one and only one object. In other words, when we
conceive of ourselves as retaining a belief we usually see as ourselves as
maintaining a relation to a particular object of belief. Thus if Nora retains
her friendship with Jon, she does not do so by being a friend of Jon’s at a
time t1 and then being a friend of Eric’s at a later time t2. Second,
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qETERNALISM fails to tells us what it means to ‘retain’ a belief as
opposed to simply believing two unrelated propositions at two different
times (which seems to be the case on this view). Third, qETERNALISM
fails according to Richard, because it is entirely ad hoc. As he puts it:
To explain the retention of belief, the temporalist appeals
exclusively to eternal propositions. Why explain only belief retention by
appeal to eternal propositions?; Why not simply say that whenever one has
a belief, the object of one’s belief is eternal? If my retaining my belief,
expressible yesterday by ‘Nixon is president’, consists in my believing
that Nixon was president yesterday, why, one may reasonably wonder,
isn’t the belief I expressed yesterday using ‘Nixon is president’ the belief
that then (yesterday) Nixon was president.14 The qETERNALIST, then,
treats the objects of all retained beliefs as eternal propositions. It is a short
step from this to full blown eternalism. And the qETERNALIST offers us
no reason to refrain from going this further step.
4. Temporalist responses to Richard
Richard’s argument against temporalism has provoked quite a
lively discussion on the subject. Before offering my own reply to Richard,
it will be helpful to briefly sketch a few temporalist replies.
Recall from the last section the following argument:

14

Ibid, p. 9
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(MARY)
[1] Mary believed that Nixon was president
[2] Mary still believes everything she once believed
______________________________________
[3] Therefore, Mary still believes that Nixon is president MARY
and similar arguments cause a problem for the temporalist because the
temporalist takes Mary as believing the temporally unspecified proposition
that ‘Nixon is president’ and if she retains this belief as [2] indicates then
she must retain the belief that ‘Nixon is president’ which of course does
not at all follow.
Mark Aronszajn15 suggests that temporalists should concede that
there is a reading of MARY on which the argument comes out valid. And
it is one of the more natural readings. Nevertheless, the terms of the
premises contain ambiguities and as a result admit of more than one
plausible reading. Aronszajn then suggests that on some of these alternate
readings MARY correctly comes out invalid, even on temporalism. He
argues, The fact is that sentence [1] is ambiguous, and the quantifier in
sentence [2] admits an indexical treatment. These points raise the
possibility that there is one inference – expressed on one interpretation, in
contexts of one particular sort – which is the one we find intuitively
invalid, and that there is some other inference – expressed on some other

15

Aronszajn 1996, p. 75
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interpretation, in contexts of some other sort – which temporalists are
committed to saying is valid. If that were the case, there wouldn’t be (at
least from that fact alone) any argument against temporalism.16
Sentence [1] is ambiguous, says Aronszajn, insofar as it can be
read as saying both that (i) there is some time t such that t is in the past
and it was the case that at t Mary believed ‘Nixon is president’ was true,
and that (ii) there is some time t such that t is in the past and it was the
case that at t Mary believed ‘Nixon was president.’ On the first reading the
past tense of the embedded verb (was) in [1] is vacuous, and on the second
the past tense of the embedded verb is anaphoric on the past tense of the
attitude verb (believed). According to Aronszajn, if [1] is read as meaning
that Mary believed at t that at some time prior to t Nixon was president,
then MARY is invalid—even if temporalism is true. While [1] is more
naturally given a reading according to which what Mary believed was that
Nixon is president, Aronszajn thinks it is possible that we find MARY
invalid because we tend to conflate the two readings
[2] also admits multiple readings insofar as it contains the
quantifying phrase ‘everything she ever believed.’ This phrase can be read
in at last two ways. On the first reading ‘everything’ quantifies over an
unrestricted domain, as in ‘everything exists.’ On the second reading
‘everything’ quantifies a restricted domain, as in ‘as soon as everyone is
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here, we’ll start the meeting.’ Clearly in cases like the latter we do not
assume the domain of the quantifier is unrestricted. We do not usually
wait for the Pope to arrive before proceeding with the meeting. Aronszajn
think it likely that in most cases we would read the quantifier as restricted.
In this case, he suggests, it could be restricted to only eternal propositions.
But, if the domain of the quantifier ‘everything’ is restricted to just eternal
propositions, then MARY comes out invalid on both eternalism and
temporalism (it bears mentioning, as we said above, that the temporalist
has both eternal and temporal propositions available in his ontology).
Aronszajn also offers a reply to IMARY. Remember that that
argument went:
(IMARY)
[a] I, Mary, believed that Nixon was up to no good in the White
House and I still believe that
__________________________________________________________
[b] Therefore, I, Mary, believe that Nixon is up to no good in the
White House
The difficulty in IMARY is that the conjunct in the premise seems to say:
I, Mary, still believe whatever I believed earlier. But on temporalism the
proposition Mary believed earlier was the temporally unspecified
proposition ‘Nixon is up to no good in the White House’. Thus if Mary
still believes whatever she believed then she believes that ‘Nixon is up to
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no good in the White House.’ But this does not seem to follow intuitively
from the premise.
Aronszajn replies that the premise of the argument is ambiguous
because there is more than one way to read the demonstrative ‘that’ at the
end of the premise. On one reading ‘that’ just is a demonstrative which
points to the belief of the earlier occasion. In this case, ‘I still believe that’
comes out to ‘I, Mary, still believe that Nixon is up to no good in the
White House’. On this reading of ‘that’ the inference in IMARY comes
out valid. So the temporalist is committed to the validity of IMARY. On
an alternative reading however, ‘that’ is understood as a ‘pronoun of
laziness,’ a term which stands in for a noun or phrase which proceeds it.
For instance in the expression:
(S) Superman lifted the mountain. This was very taxing.
In (S) ‘this’ is a pronoun of laziness standing in for ‘Superman lifted the
mountain’. Aronszajn argues that if ‘that’ in IMARY is a pronoun of
laziness like ‘this’, then ‘I, Mary still believe that’ should be read as
elliptical, standing for ‘I Mary still believe that Nixon was up to no good
in the White House.’ From this it certainly does not follow that Mary
believes that Nixon is up to no good in the White House. Therefore on this
alternative reading (which seems equally as plausible as the first) IMARY
comes out invalid, and there is no harm here for the temporalist.
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Aronszajn suggests that when we are presented with arguments
like IMARY, since the argument admits more than one plausible reading,
we ought to be guided by the following pragmatic rule: (PR) If a belief
ascription is ambiguous, pick an interpretation that is charitable regarding
which belief it ascribes, given prevailing conceptions of normalcy in
beliefs, and any other relevant information supplied either by the context
or in the larger discourse in which the belief ascription occurs.17 In
IMARY the premise entails the conclusion on one reading, but we are
reluctant to attribute to Mary the belief that ‘Nixon is up to no good in the
White House’ because this seemingly insults her intelligence. As
Aronszajn puts it: [T]he semantics for [‘Mary believed that Nixon was up
to no good in the White House’] entails that Mary believed the non-eternal
proposition that [Nixon] is up to no good in the White House, and … in
some contexts we could accept that this is the proposition [‘she still
believes that’] says Mary believes. However, in the present context we
hesitate to accept this. It would be quite abnormal today for someone to
believe that [Nixon] is up to anything in the White House. So at present,
we find inference [IMARY] questionable because we now find it
uncharitable to attribute such a belief to Mary. [PR] requires that we seek
another, more charitable interpretation of the first line of [IMARY]. And
there is one: the lazy interpretation mentioned above. … But then we are

17

Ibid, p. 88

Taylor, Adam P., 2006, UMSL, p. 27
taking the sentence to express a proposition … from which the conclusion
of [IMARY] does not follow. Hence we find the inference unacceptable.18
The reason IMARY seems to be invalid is that we choose the lazy reading
of the second conjunct for charitable reasons. In other words we take Mary
as believing that ‘Nixon was up to no good in the White House’. But in
other contexts we could equally as plausibly take the proposition Mary
believed on the earlier occasion to be the proposition that ‘Nixon is up to
no good in the White House.’
Aronszajn ends his defense of temporalism by presenting the
following problem for eternalism, consider the argument:
(1992)
[c] In 1990, Mary believed that Bush was up to no good in the
White House.
[d] In 1992, Mary still believed everything she believed back in
1990.
__________________________________________________________
[e] Hence, in 1992, Mary believed that Bush was up to no good in
the White House.
The inference in 1992 seems to be valid. However if eternalism is right,
then the inference cannot be valid. For, in that case, the first premise is
true iff in 1990 Mary believes that Bush is up to no good in the White
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House in 1990. And the second premise is true iff for any proposition p, if
Mary believes p in 1990, then she believes p in 1992. And finally the
conclusion is true iff in 1992 Mary believes that Bush is up to no good in
the White House in 1992. Eternalism, says Aronszajn, fails to get the right
truth conditions for 1992. On eternalism the conclusion of 1992 ought to
be read as ‘in 1992 Mary believes that Bush is up to no good in the White
House in 1992,’ which clearly does not follow from [c] and [d]. Problem.
Thus the tables are turned on the eternalist and the temporalist can
formulate a Richardian argument against eternalism, that is, that we ought
to reject eternalism given its commitment to the invalidity of an intuitively
valid argument.
In response to Aronszajn, G.W. Fitch19 argues that, contrary to
appearances, eternalism does make the right inferences in cases like 1992.
In other words he thinks that 1992 is invalid, as he says it seems to me that
the natural reading of [c] is that in 1990 Mary believed that Bush was up
to no good in the White House in 1990; the natural reading of [d] is that by
1992 Mary had not changed her beliefs with respect to what she believed
in 1990 – in particular, in 1992 Mary still believed that Bush had been up
to no good in the White House in 1990; and finally, the natural reading of
[e] follows that of [c], namely that in 1992 Mary believed that Bush was
up to no good in the White House in 1992. Given these readings of [c], [d]
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and [e], it is easy to see that the inference fails, since nothing in the
premises assures us that Mary believed that Bush was up to no good in
1992.20 According to Fitch, our pre-theoretical intuitions cannot be used to
settle the validity or invalidity of 1992, as Aronszajn supposes. Since it is
possible to provide eternalist truth conditions for 1992, and temporalist
truth conditions for the same, Fitch thinks it is self-serving for either side
to claim that the pre-theoretical intuitions of ordinary language users
favors their truth conditions, or their interpretation, over the other. Pace
Fitch, I think it is a matter for empirical investigation which truth
conditions are favored by the pre-theoretical intuitions of language users.
It is not self serving for Aronszajn to claim that these intuitions favor his
position. It may turn out to be empirically incorrect. But if it is correct,
then Aronszajn has made a very strong case.
Moreover, Fitch offers the following case of dialogue as support
for eternalism: (ARIZONA)
(Eric and Jon are on the phone on July 1)
Eric: Where are you? Jon: I am in Arizona
(Eric and Jon are at an APA meeting in New York on August 1)
Eric: Did you believe what you said on July 1?
Jon: Yes, and I still believe it.
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The problem here is that, on eternalism, the belief that Jon is ascribing to
himself in August is the temporally unspecified belief ‘I am in Arizona.’
But, barring schizophrenia on Jon’s part, this is clearly not how we should
take Jon’s response in this case. What Jon intends to say is that on July 1
he was in Arizona, and at present he still believes that on July 1 he was in
Arizona. Perhaps, some might think, the ‘it’ in ‘I still believe it’ is a
‘pronoun of laziness’ and proxy for some other more felicitous
proposition. Unfortunately this route is blocked, because if ‘it’ goes proxy
at all, it is for the temporally unspecified proposition ‘I am in Arizona’
which is precisely the result we are taking pains to avoid. So it seems like
cases such as ARIZONA pose further problems for the temporalist.
In her forthcoming work, Berit Brogaard argues for another
version of temporalism which, she thinks, avoids both Richards arguments
and the difficulties Fitch presents for accounts like Aronszajn’s.
According to Brogaard, and here I concur, Aronszajn’s pragmatic account
of the seeming invalidity of MARY and JOHN is considerably weaker
than his pragmatic account of the seeming invalidity of IMARY. Brogaard
thinks we must look elsewhere for a resolution of MARY and JOHN.
Returning to Richard’s arguments on behalf of the temporalist,
Brogaard notes that on both of the strategies Richard suggests ‘to retain a
belief is not to continue to believe the same proposition. Rather, it is to
believe a proposition related in some special way to the proposition
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originally believed.’ On the one strategy what one continues to believe
when one retains a belief in a proposition is simply that proposition + a
past tense operator, such that one’s belief that ‘Nixon is president’ when
retained becomes the belief that ‘Nixon was president’ where ‘was’ is not
vacuous, but indicates a tense. On the other strategy what one continues to
believe is some temporally specified (i.e. eternal) proposition such that
one’s belief that Nixon is president’ at t1 becomes the belief that ‘Nixon
was president at t1.’ Both strategies fail, per Richard, because they fail to
specify what belief retention consists of if not ‘maintaining a relation
(belief) to a particular object (presumably) a proposition.’
Brogaard argues21 that while the second strategy is ad hoc, as
Richard claims, the first strategy is simply insufficiently developed. As it
stands, the first strategy leaves retained beliefs too unspecific. To correct
this, Brogaard proposes that, primarily, to retain a belief is to maintain a
belief relation to one and the same object over time. But one can also
retain a belief secondarily by maintaining a belief relation to an object that
is appropriately related to the original object. When one continues to
believe that Nixon is president for four years, one maintains a belief
relation to a particular object over time, namely the temporal proposition
that Nixon is president. If Nixon is then impeached, one ceases believing
that Nixon is president and forms a new belief, in this case, that Nixon was
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president but isn’t anymore. Thus, when one continues to believe that p,
one’s original belief that p is retained. But even when one continues to
believe that Pp (where the semantic value of P is a tense operator such as
‘it was the case that’) one’s original belief is essentially retained. On this
view of belief retention
Some will argue, Brogaard continues, that the paraphrase of the
second premise of MARY which her account of belief retention provides,
namely, that Mary continues to believe that ‘it was the case that Nixon is
president,’ is too liberal. On this charge there is no reason to think that that
is what is meant by ‘Mary still believes everything she once believed.’
Brogaard has a response to this: we should employ something like
Aronszajn’s rule (PR). In other words, strictly speaking, MARY comes
out valid, but because when tend to think of belief retention in the terms
Richard suggests (as a relation to only one object) we tend to offer a nonliteral interpretation of the second premise on which MARY comes out
invalid.
This strategy also works, according to Brogaard, for cases like
(ARIZONA)
(Eric and Jon are on the phone on July 1)
Eric: Where are you? Jon: I am in Arizona
(Eric and Jon are at an APA meeting in New York on January 1)
Eric: Did you believe what you said on July 1?
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Jon: Yes, and I still believe it.
In such cases, the belief that Jon retains on August 1 is not the temporally
unspecific proposition ‘I am in Arizona’ but rather a related belief
incorporating the appropriate tense operator, for instance: ‘I was in
Arizona.’ As Brogaard points out, there is still issue of belief retention’s
being a one-at-time relation to resolve. Her response is two-pronged. First
she admits that on temporalism some beliefs are retained by continuing to
believe a single (eternal) proposition over time, as in ‘I believe John
Kennedy was assassinated at 12:30 CST November 22, 1963.’ Second,
temporalism leaves open the possibility that we can also retain our belief
in unspecified temporal propositions such as ‘Nixon is president,’ by
maintaining a belief relation to an appropriately related belief such as
‘Nixon was president.’ Eternalists are unable to allow this second strain of
belief retention. On eternalism, to continue to believe that ‘Nixon is
president’ is to have potentially infinitely many atomic beliefs, as we saw
in the introduction (above)
At t1… (E1) Nixon is president at t1
At t2… (E2) Nixon is president at t2
At t3… (E3) Nixon is president at t3
At t4… (E4) Nixon is president at t4
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On an atomic conception of time, retaining the belief ‘Nixon is president’
means believing it at every atomic instant of time. Brogaard takes this
account of retention as problematic for the eternalist.
Brogaard also considers an argument against temporalism from
Evans (1985: 349-50) which turns on the ‘Incompleteness Hypothesis’

Incompleteness Hypothesis
A tensed sentence that does not make explicit or implicit reference to a
time is not truth evaluable

this hypothesis traces back to the argument made by Frege about
sentences such as “the tree is green”. The argument from incompleteness
runs as follows. It is a necessary truth about instantiated properties that
they must be instantiated at some particular time. Borrowing Brogaard’s
example: if John is a firefighter, then he must be a firefighter at some time.
Thus, no complete proposition can be expressed by ‘John is a firefighter’
until some time is appended to the sentence. Brogaard points out that there
is an analogy between “John is a firefighter” and other sentences like
“Jane is ready.” The latter does not express a complete proposition until
some act is supplied. It cannot be evaluated for truth until we are told what
Jane is supposed to be ready for. Brogaard argues that the reasoning
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behind arguments from the Incompleteness is ‘highly suspect’. Following
Cappelen and Lepore22 (forthcoming) that
“[F]rom the fact that a given event or state-of-affairs requires for
its existence a particular property, it does not follow that the
property is a constituent of a proposition concerning it. For
example, from the fact that a driving occurs at a certain speed, we
should not want to conclude that the proposition expressed by
‘John drove to Chicago last night’ contains a certain speed. And
from the fact that a typewriting occurs at a certain pace, we should
not want to conclude that the proposition expressed by ‘Nora is
typing a letter’ contains a particular pace. Likewise, from the fact
that John cannot instantiate the property of being a firefighter
without instantiating it at some time, we should not want to
conclude that there is a time in the proposition expressed by ‘John
is a firefighter’.”23
However, I think the reasoning behind the argument from the
Incompleteness Hypothesis may be stronger than Brogaard supposes. In
particular, I think that the analogy between the cases of velocity and
pacing and temporality does not go through. It is true that the proposition
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‘John drove home’ need not contain velocity, and that the proposition
Nora is typing need not contain a particular pace. But it does not follow
from this that ‘John is a firefighter’ need not contain some particular time
(or times). I contend that ‘being x’ is a special class of property that
requires a specific time indication to be evaluated for truth whenever it is
instantiated. In Brogaard’s cases John is not being driving home, nor is
Nora being typing a letter, but John is being a firefighter, and as such the
proposition ‘John is a firefighter’ must contain a time. As I see it, the
difference between the former and latter cases is that there is no intrinsic
velocity to the act of driving and no intrinsic pace to the act of typing, but
there is intrinsic temporality to being. If a thing exists, it must have (at
least instantaneous) temporal extension. So, I think, Brogaard’s
counterexamples can be resolved.
To sum up then, Aronszajn suggests that Richard’s argument from
belief retention hangs on ambiguous examples, whose conclusions can, he
admits, be read as problematic for temporalism. Yet on other plausible
readings they come out invalid even for temporalism. He then suggests
that when faced with such examples we err on the side of charity, offering
the reading which least insults the intelligence of the subject in the
question. He then offers a counter argument, 1992, which he thinks shows
a shortcoming in eternalism. Fitch responds to Aronszajn’s counter
arguments by saying that he errs in allowing his pre-theoretical intuitions
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to guide his view of the plausibility of alternate readings of MARY and
IMARY. He then offers his own counter-argument to Aronszajn, the
Arizona case. Into this discussion, Brogaard adds that Richard has
dismissed too quickly the possibility that belief retention could be stated in
terms of a relation to an adequately related propositions. Instead of always
being a relation to one and the same belief over time. She then goes on to
propose something like Aronszajn’s pragmatic rule: in this case when the
one-at-time view of retention makes a reading come out clearly invalid,
we should charitably suppose that the second sort of retention (retention of
an adequately related belief) is entailed. Finally she raises the argument
from the Incompleteness Hypothesis, and suggests that Cappelen and
Lepore’s strategy for answering similar cases regarding spatial locations
can be applied in the temporal case to overcome this objection.

6. My Solution
That is the more or less where the debate stands at the moment. I
now turn to my own reply to Richard. My response to Richard’s argument
begins by unpacking a particular theory about propositions. Propositions
are, as I said at the outset, generally understood as the (abstract) shareable
objects of belief, meanings of sentences, and vehicles of truth-values. We
have already seen that temporalists add minimally to this definition. In
particular they add that some propositions are eternal (containing implicit
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time-references) and others are temporal (temporally unspecified). (It
bears noting that this addition is not nominal—it postulates a genuine
difference between eternal and temporal propositions—the temporalists
are making an ontological claim). I now wish to add even more to that
definition. Thus, I suggest that the eternalist should take the following
view of propositions. I agree with Frege, and Richard, that all propositions
are eternal propositions. However, I am quite sympathetic to the
temporalist intuition that not all propositions seem temporally specified.
Certainly from a pretheoretical standpoint, it seems like we often express
temporally unspecified propositions. One way to bridge the competing
views, is to offer an eternalist account which posits temporally unspecified
propositions.
My own view, which I will call durationalism, attempts to provide
an eternalist framework for temporal propositions. Traditional eternalism
is a single-denomination view of propositions. This brand of eternalism
takes all propositions to be eternal (temporally specified) propositions, and
chalks up any seemingly unspecified propositions to loose talk, or
incomplete expressions. Traditional temporalism is a multipledenomination view. Temporalism says there are both eternal and temporal
propositions.
On the view I am suggesting we should depart from the traditional
single-denomination eternalist accounts, which hold that there are no
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temporal propositions at all, and opt instead for a multiple- denomination
account, which attempts to account for temporal propositions
eternalistically. On the view I am offering, a temporal proposition will not
contain a time, but rather a set of times at which properties are distributed
across temporal objects. On this view, which I call ‘durationalism’ it is not
the temporal proposition per se that contains a time, rather it is the
metaphysical constituents of the proposition (the objects and their
properties), which are temporal, so that while the temporalist is correct to
say the proposition itself contains no reference to a time, the presence of
temporally located objects and properties in the proposition imports a time
or times (i.e., a duration) to the expression of the proposition.
Fregean incompleteness arguments attempt to eliminate temporal
propositions by arguing that they are simply cases of incomplete
expression of standard eternal propositions. So that:
(3) Nora is sleeping
is simply an incomplete expression of some eternal proposition like
(3`) Nora is sleeping at t
where t is a time indexical (e.g. 4:30 am CST July 4, 2006). My goal is to
incorporate temporal propositions into eternalism without necessarily
appending a time indexical to them. I do so by arguing that we treat the
object of (3) (Nora) with metaphysical seriousness; that is we treat Nora as
a concretely existing object of an abstract proposition. As a concrete
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object, Nora exists at a time. My argument for this is a temporalized
version of Kant’s argument for pure space. In other words for any object
we can imagine we cannot separate that object from its temporal location
any more than we can separate it from its spatial location. We cannot
imagine an apple, for example, without imagining the (apple-shaped)
space the apple occupies. Likewise we cannot imagine Nora separately
from the (Nora shaped)24 time she occupies.
Now someone might object that even if we cannot imagine Nora
existing separate from time simplicter, we can nevertheless imagine Nora
existing separately from any particular time. This presents a problem for
my view. I am arguing that all propositions about Nora refer to a Nora
shaped time, but it seems like that is not enough to fix the temporal
reference that my theory needs. It might be the case that there are many
possibly Nora shaped times which are unrelated to each other (e.g. as in
the case of Nora time- travelling). I have argued that “Nora” picks out a
concrete object and in so doing imports the time(s) at which that object
exists into the proposition. If there is no specific time(s) the concrete
object picks out, then there is no information imparted, and thus the
proposition is simply incomplete (as in standard eternalism). Both
24
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eternalists and temporalists will agree that in order for (3) to be truth
evaluable, “Nora” needs to pick out an object (and in this case a concrete
object). If it does not then (3) expresses no proposition at all. On the other
hand if “Nora” does pick out a concrete object then that object will have a
fixed temporal location, defined as either a single temporal coordinate—
for instantaneous objects (if there are such)— or a series of contiguous
temporal coordinates for objects of a particular duration. It is my
contention that all propositions contain at least a duration of times, if not a
precise temporal coordinate.
In claiming this, I essentially argue that temporalism is wrong
about the nature of temporal propositions (specifically insomuch as it says
they do not contain implicit times). However, I also argue that traditional
eternalism (as exemplified by Frege and Richard) is imprecise. It is not the
case that every proposition must contain a particular time. I contend that
some propositions contain a time, while others contain a duration (or a
group or set of contiguous times).
My view is therefore in opposition to both temporalism and
traditional eternalism, though it could be viewed as eternalism of another
stripe.
To clarify a bit, I propose that standard eternal propositions (of the
form: x is y at t) should be regarded as attributing properties to their
objects atomically, while temporal propositions should be regarded as
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attributing properties to their objects durationally. For example when I say
‘John Kennedy is president at 12:34 CST June 5, 1962’ the property (is
president) is distributed to the object of this proposition (John Kennedy)
atomically (at 12:34 CST June 5 1962.) However, when I say ‘John
Kennedy is president,’ the property (is president) is distributed to the
object of the proposition (John Kennedy) durationally. The upshot to this
view is that durational properties do not have to be distributed uniformly
across their object in order for the object to posses that property. For
instance, if I put one end of a poker in the fireplace, the poker will get
glowing hot at one end, but be cool enough for me to pick up at the other
end. And even so we will refer to the poker as a ‘hot poker.’ Another
example, suppose if I say to my friend ‘this apple is very red’ It would be
wrong, most would agree, to infer from this that the property ‘is red’ is
uniformly distributed throughout the apple. After all if I bite into the apple
I will find that most of the interior is white and some of the seeds are
black. Likewise in the proposition:
(N) Nixon is president
the property ‘is president’ is distributed durationally over the object
Nixon. Thus it will not always be the case that (N) comes out true. At
some times Nixon will be president and at others Nixon will not be
president, just as in some places the apple will be red or the poker will be
hot but not in every place.
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Let us now return to Richard’s first problem case:

(MARY)
[1] Mary believed that Nixon was president
[2] Mary still believes everything she once believed
______________________________________
[3] Therefore, Mary still believes that Nixon is president

In the case of MARY, the durationalist has a reply. On durationalism
MARY comes out valid iff the property ‘is president’ is uniformly
distributed over Nixon at all times at which Nixon exists. If it is not so
distributed, then MARY comes out invalid. Because there will be times at
which Nixon is president and other times at which he is not president. It
would be an insult to Mary, and to anyone who understands the meaning
of ‘Nixon’ or ‘is president’ to suppose that they would take ‘is president’
to apply uniformly to the object ‘Nixon’. After all, presidents serve limited
terms. So it will not always be the case that Nixon is president is true. It
will be true at some times, but false at others, just as it will be true in some
places that the apple is red while it will be false at others.
Notice, however, that the durationalist does not need the embedded
proposition ‘Nixon was president’ to comtaim a particular time in order to
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determine that the conclusion in MARY is invalid. The determination
simply follows from conjunction of the nature of the object of the
proposition and the nature of property distributed by the proposition. In
this case, on durationalism, there will not be enough information in [1] and
[2] to elicit the conclusion [3]. Consider the similar case
(PMARY)
[1] Mary believed that the poker was hot
[2] Mary still believes everything she once believed
______________________________________
[3] Therefore, Mary still believes that poker is hot
the conclusion of PMARY does not follow because the property ‘is hot’ is
not necessarily uniformly distributed across the object of the proposition.
At some times the poker will be hot, at other times it will not be.
As for Richard’s second case
(IMARY)
[a] I, Mary, believed that Nixon was up to no good in the White
House and I still believe that
_____________________________________________________
[b] Therefore, I, Mary, believe that Nixon is up to no good in the
White House
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here the durationalist has an equally simple reply. On durationalism,
IMARY comes out valid iff the property (is up to no good in the White
House) being ascribed to the object (Nixon) is uniformly distributed.
Certainly no one would think that this is the case. Nixon could not, for
instance, have been up to no good in the White House while he slept, or
when he was 12 years old, etc. Since the property is not uniformly
distributed, IMARY cannot possibly come out valid. Thus durationalism
avoids this problem as well.
Richard raised another concern, though, that temporalism required
us either to commit to qETERNALISM, or else to argue that belief
retention could plausibly be seen as maintaining a relation not to one
belief at a time, but to a belief which is adequately related to the original
belief (as was Brogaard’s strategy). Durationalism avoids qETERNALSM
insofar as the durationalist argues that when one retains her belief in a
temporal proposition no time-reference is thereby supplemented.
Durationalism also differs somewhat from the Richard/Brogaard position
(which I will call standard relationalism), though it can be seen as another
form of relationalism.
Recall that Brogaard thinks that when we retain our belief that
‘Nixon is president’ it is plausible that we do so by maintaining a belief
relation not to this one proposition, but to another adequately related
proposition such as ‘Nixon was president.’ On the durationalist view,
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when we retain our belief that ‘Nixon is president’ we do so by
maintaining a belief relation not to this same proposition but another
proposition such as ‘Nixon was once president’ or ‘Nixon was sometime
president.’
Finally, consider Fitch’s case:
(ARIZONA)
(Eric and Jon are on the phone on July 1)
Eric: Where are you? Jon: I am in Arizona
(Eric and Jon are at an APA meeting in New York on January 1)
Eric: Did you believe what you said on July 1?
Jon: Yes, and I still believe it.
How does durationalism reply to this case? Clearly, the property ‘in
Arizona’ is not intended to be distributed uniformly across Jon. Suppose
someone calls me while I am in the tub, and I tell them I am in the tub.
Clearly I do not mean that all of me is in the tub, some of me is clearly
above the tub and outside the tub. Likewise here, the property (in Arizona)
of the temporal proposition (I am in Arizona) is true of the object only at
certain times. On durationalism, ‘I am in Arizona’ it is retained will come
out as ‘I am sometimes in Arizona’ or ‘I was once in Arizona.’ So the
durationalist avoids the Fitch’s problem as well.
I think the durationalist view has some intuitive appeal. It seems
right to me that property attributions often generalize over objects. In
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loose talk, we frequently attribute properties uniformly where we do not
really mean to. Since temporal propositions make no specific references to
times, it seems intuitively right that when we employ them, we do not
intend the attributions they make to be applied uniformly at all times at
which the object exists. Furthermore, on the durationalist view we get the
right results to Richard and Fitch’s problem cases.
So I propose that the eternalist adopt this, or a suitably related,
multiple-denomination view of propositions. Some propositions will
contain explicit or implicit time references, others will refer durationally
(i.e., they will not directly refer to a time at all, but rather to a set of times
(i.e. a duration) at which properties which are distributed across temporal
objects) insofar as they contain constituent objects which are intrinsically
temporal.

